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A Dynamic Process Model of Private Politics: 
Activist Targeting and Corporate Receptivity to Social Challenges 
ABSTRACT 
This project explores whether and how corporations become more receptive to social activist 
challenges over time.  Drawing from social movement theory, we suggest a dynamic process 
through which contentious interactions lead to increased receptivity.  We argue that when firms 
are chronically targeted by social activists, they respond defensively by adopting strategic 
management devices that help them better manage social issues and demonstrate their normative 
appropriateness.  These defensive devices have the incidental effect of empowering independent 
monitors and increasing corporate accountability, which in turn increases a firm's receptivity to 
future activist challenges.  We test our theory using a unique longitudinal dataset that tracks 
contentious attacks and the adoption of social management devices among a population of 300 





Recent research demonstrates that social movements are capable of influencing corporate 
behavior, ranging from curbing harmful toxic emissions to granting employees same-sex 
domestic partnership benefits to divesting from politically risky countries (e.g., Maxwell et al. 
1995; Raeburn 2004; Soule et al. 2014). While most of this research acknowledges that 
movements targeting firms operate within a broader corporate opportunity structure, we lack a 
precise understanding of the variation in corporate opportunity structures across firms and over 
time.   
The goal of this paper is to explain why certain companies’ opportunity structures 
become more receptive to social movements over time. We argue that corporate opportunity 
structures are altered by complaints about firms’ policies and practices, and we suggest a 
processual account of the evolution of corporate opportunity structures.  Specifically, we suggest 
that firms challenged by activists seek to defend themselves by adopting what we call social 
management devices: structures or practices meant to help a firm manage and promote its social 
image.  The adoption of social management devices in turn alters a firm’s internal political 
agenda such that the firm becomes more receptive to future activist claims.  In this way, social 
management devices moderate the relationship between a firm’s past interactions with activists 
and its future receptivity to activists.  
We test these claims using a unique longitudinal dataset that follows three hundred large 
US firms from 1993-2009.  The dataset tracks social movement activism in the form of boycotts 
directed at firms and firm adoption of two types of social management devises: formal structural 
changes (adoption of a corporate social responsibility board committee) and increased disclosure 
(the dissemination of a social responsibility report). Additionally, we look at every proxy 
proposal submitted by shareholder activists engaged in social issues across this time frame, as 
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well as each firm’s response to the proposals it received, so that we can track changes in 
corporations’ receptiveness to a wide variety of social challenges.  Our findings show that firms 
frequently targeted by activists are more likely to adopt social management devices. These 
devices, in turn, increase corporate accountability for social issues, leading to an observable 
increase in firm receptivity to future activist challenges.  
Our analysis addresses two research questions: Do activist challenges lead firms to 
become more or less receptive to future challenges?  If so, why? Social movement scholars have 
long recognized that activism has both indirect and unanticipated consequences (Snow and Soule 
2010). Like their public sector counterparts, movements targeting private sector entities can also 
have indirect and unanticipated effects (McDonnell and King 2013; Yue, Rao and Ingram 2013).  
Our paper extends this work by illustrating that one critical indirect and unanticipated 
consequence of activism is the collective molding of a more receptive field of private-sector 
targets.  Specifically, when firms are chronically targeted by social movements they expand their 
repertoire of defensive practices, which include structural reforms to address the management of 
activists’ issues and disclosure reforms to better communicate the firm’s social activities. 
Although companies may initially adopt these social management devices as defensive measures, 
these devices also demonstrate a commitment to social responsibility and empower new monitors 
of social activity.  These incidental effects of social management devices create new 
opportunities for activist influence, changing the calculus of future decisions about socially 
responsible corporate practices. By prompting targets to adopt defensive social structures and 
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practices, therefore, activist challenges contribute to making a resistant firm become more 
receptive to social activists.1  
We contribute to social movement theory by offering a far more dynamic and processual 
theoretical perspective on movement opportunity structures.  In most accounts opportunity 
structures are depicted as exogenous to movements and composed of static differences between 
targets. Rather than thinking of political opportunities as static characteristics of a movement’s 
political environment, our findings suggest that scholars ought to conceptualize opportunity 
structures as dynamic and evolving in relation to activist challenges.  Moreover, our results 
imply that social movements’ influence may, in many situations, extend beyond the immediate 
successes or failures of a given campaign. Inasmuch as activists trigger defensive responses by 
their targets and alter their targets’ future decision-making, movements’ actions have longer-term 
consequences, potentially opening up new inroads of influence for activists that follow in their 
wake.   
 
ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES: CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
AND RECEPTIVITY TO ACTIVISM  
 
While social activist challenges are now a ubiquitous part of organizational life, there is 
marked variation in the way that targeted firms respond.  Some firms seek to suppress activists 
by treating them with hostility, while others acquiesce relatively quickly to activists’ demands 
(Zald, Morrill, and Rao 2005; Baron and Diermeier 2007; Maguire and Hardy 2009).  This 
                                                          
1 While scholars in the broader social movement literature allude to the possibility that 
opportunity structures may be influenced by social movements, it remains unclear whether and 
how movements shift opportunity structures (e.g., Gamson and Meyer 1996). For notable 
exceptions, see Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, and Su (1999) and Costain (1992), both of whom 
examine the impact of women’s activism on the political opportunity structure of the U.S. 




variation is important, as it shapes the immediate and long-term impact of anti-corporate 
movements and, ultimately, the substance and form of corporate social activity.     
Scholars exploring corporate responses to activism have drawn extensively on social 
movement theory (e.g., King and Pearce 2010; Soule 2012).   In particular, they note that the 
corporate opportunity structure of firms shapes the mobilization and outcomes of anti-corporate 
mobilization (Walker et al. 2008; King 2008b; Soule 2009).  Characteristics of firms that are 
purported to influence mobilization and outcomes include the firm’s field position or past 
engagement in pro-social activity (McDonnell and King 2013), size, status, or reputation (King 
2008a; Bartley and Child 2011; 2014; King and McDonnell, 2015), and the ideological 
orientation of a firm’s leadership (Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick 2014).  Firms that accumulate a 
history of interactions with activists develop reputations as being either resistant or receptive to 
social challenges (Zald, Morrill, and Rao 2005; Baron and Diermier 2007; Briscoe and Safford 
2008).  In turn, a firm’s reputation for being activist-resistant or activist-receptive may be 
heuristically employed by activists as an indicator of the openness of its corporate opportunity 
structure.     
Clearly, there is wide variation in firm responsiveness to movements’ challenges. Firms 
that occupy elite positions in their field often have their power and interests vested in the status 
quo, incentivizing them to resist or repress change agents (Fligstein 1996; Friedland and Alford 
1991; Maguire and Hardy 2009; Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  When such firms are challenged 
by activists, their leaders’ first response is often defensive, drawing on impression management 
strategies that evade, rather than address, the activists’ concerns (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; 
McDonnell and King 2013).  Others, such as Starbucks or Whole Foods, try instead to situate 
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themselves at the social vanguard by crafting their identities around receptivity to activists 
(Briscoe and Safford 2008) and may even act as activists themselves (e.g., McDonnell 2015). 
  A firm’s position as being either responsive or resistant to activists is only ascertainable 
by virtue of the firm’s observable, historical responses to past movement challenges.  One clear 
public record of such responses is a company’s past treatment of social-issue proxy proposals 
submitted by its shareholders.  Proxy proposals (or “shareholder resolutions”) are written 
proposals presented to be voted on at a company’s annual meeting.  Shareholders use proxy 
proposals as a platform to bring a wide range of social issues to the attention of a company’s 
management.  As a consequence, many traditional social movement organizations now operate 
activist investing units that buy stakes in companies in order to submit resolutions to air their 
grievances (Model et al., 2014).  For example, in 2010, People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals reported holding stock in over 80 companies (PETA Press Release, 2010).  Like more 
traditional protest tactics, their resolutions are crafted to garner maximum media coverage, 
“us[ing] graphic language to show other shareholders how the companies in which they invest 
abuse animals.”  By placing issues on the corporate proxy, social movement organizations like 
PETA work to place their issues on the corporate agenda.  
In the corporate setting, opportunity structures are the product of a multi-layered system, 
encompassing both organization-level political regimes and the overarching institutional 
constraints imposed by federal and judicial regulation (Soule 2009).   In the case of social proxy 
proposals, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is empowered to act as an external 
gatekeeper for shareholders wishing to place a proxy proposal on a firm’s annual proxy.   By 
SEC rules, certain shareholder proposals may be excluded by corporations. Companies wishing 
to exclude a shareholder proposal must first file a formal challenge with the SEC to request 
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permission to do so. In this way, SEC policies create a ceiling to limit how closed corporations 
can be to activists vying for access through the corporate proxy.   
Despite these boundaries imposed by the SEC, individual corporations enjoy relative 
latitude in responding to shareholder proposals.  While companies must include any proposal that 
the SEC deems non-excludable, companies are not forced to exclude a proposal just because the 
SEC has deemed its subject matter to be excludable.  For example, until 2009, the SEC allowed 
companies to exclude proposals relating to assessments of environmental risk.   Several 
companies that received such proposals successfully challenged them, including Mead 
Corporation and Willamette Industries in 2001.  Nonetheless, prior to 2009 numerous 
companies, including General Electric in 1998, Eastman Kodak in 1999, and Tyco International 
in 2004, allowed environmental proposals on their ballots.  These companies demonstrated their 
receptivity to social challenges by choosing not to fight against a clearly excludable proposal.  
Still other companies were even more receptive, such as the Gillette Company, which received a 
proposal relating to environmental risk in 2003.  Rather than challenge the proposal or put it to a 
shareholder vote, Gillette opted to concede, and the proposal was voluntarily withdrawn by its 
proponents prior to the annual meeting.    
 A firm’s response to social-issue proxy proposals is an indicator of the openness of its 
corporate opportunity structure.  Firms that allow shareholder activists liberal access to the 
proxy, or concede to activist shareholders without resistance, demonstrate more receptiveness to 
activists, which in turn signals that they have a more open opportunity structure than others in 
the field.  In contrast, more resistant firms may seek to exclude every proposal they receive, 
fighting even those proposals that are unlikely to be ultimately deemed excludable by the SEC.  
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In so constraining access to their organization’s formal channels, these companies demonstrate 
less receptiveness, signaling a more closed opportunity structure.   
 
How Do Activist Challenges Influence a Firm’s Future Receptivity to Social Activism? 
Prior research suggests that a firm’s past resistance to activism is predictive of its future 
resistance.  Firms tend to use the same strategic responses to activists over time, suggesting that 
responses to activists may be a routinized component of firms’ “performance repertoire” 
(McDonnell and King 2015).  But certainly, a firm’s responsiveness to activism may evolve. 
Consider, for example, the case of Nike, which has a long history of contentious interactions 
with its stakeholders.  From the 1970s to the 1990s, Nike was accused by activists of using 
sweatshop labor, and steadfastly resisted changing.  As Todd McKean, Nike’s director of 
compliance, stated in a 2001 interview, “Our initial attitude was, ‘Hey, we don’t own the 
factories.  We don’t control what goes on there” (Heckel 2001).  In the late 1990s, however, after 
high profile protests at over 40 universities that held contracts with the company, Nike began to 
change its tune.   In 1999, the company adopted a code of conduct to govern its factories; over 
the next five years, it audited its factories over six hundred times to assure compliance (Sage 
1999; Bernstein 2004).  Today, Nike is arguably one of the most activist-receptive companies in 
the retail industry.  It is ranked at the top of its industry in Fortune’s Most Admired Companies 
list, has voluntarily conceded to all but two of the social proxy proposals submitted by its 
shareholders in the past twenty years, and has collaborated with well-known activist 
organizations like Greenpeace (Hasselback and Morton 1998; McDonnell, 2015).  Moreover, 
there was no ebb in the amount of activism that Nike felt before its about-face, which suggests 
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that activism itself may have worked to change the company’s approach to managing activist 
challenges.2    
Social movement scholars argue that political opportunities change through slow and 
sticky institutional processes (della Porta 1996; Kriesi 1995) or through abrupt and volatile 
processes (della Porta and Reiter 1998).   It is also possible that opportunity structures can be 
changed via political processes, and that activism can play a role in shaping and shifting 
opportunity structures (Soule et al. 1999).  A similar process may apply to corporate opportunity 
structures, as prior accounts of anti-corporate activism suggest that a primary goal of activists is 
to expose and affect the opportunity structures of their targets (Bartley and Child 2014; King and 
McDonnell 2015). Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994), for example, argue that activist groups 
actively work to fragment organizational fields into allies and adversaries.  By bifurcating the 
field and alienating clear targets, the movement is better able to attract and radicalize supporters 
(Alinsky 1989).   
We suggest that firms caught in the crosshairs of anti-corporate activists strategically 
adopt new structures and practices for managing activist threat.  By challenging corporations, 
external stakeholders work to ‘problematize’ an issue, seeking through disruption to gain the 
attention and response of a firm’s leaders (King 2008a; 2008b; Maguire and Hardy 2009).  Firms 
targeted by social movements can feel this disruption through damage to their reputation (King 
2008; McDonnell & King, 2013), as well as through heightened perceptions of risk and 
                                                          
2 Some argue that trends in firm response to shareholder activism have grown less friendly, citing 
evidence of increasing rates of companies excluding shareholder proposals from their proxy 
statements (RiskMetrics 2008). If this is true for social shareholder resolutions, it is possible that 
this in response to one of the key findings that we report on below. That is, perhaps companies 
that became more receptive to activists are now tightening up that access in response to the 




weakened financial performance (King and Soule 2007; Vasi and King 2012).   These adverse 
consequences of social activism draw firm leaders’ attention to the company’s ailing social 
image, prompting a search for strategic solutions.  Some prior work suggests that movements 
provoke changes in corporate strategy, such as increased impression management (McDonnell 
and King 2013) or the formation of activist alliances (McDonnell 2015), but it is unclear whether 
these outcomes signal mere “cheap talk” as opposed to veritable changes in a firm’s long-term 
approach to activist challenges.   
 While simple impression management strategies may be effective at temporarily avoiding 
or downplaying a particular challenge, firms that struggle with repeated activist challenges may 
seek more permanent measures.   These measures – which we refer to as “social management 
devices” – are structures or practices meant to assist the firm in managing its social strategy and 
demonstrating an enhanced commitment to socially responsible values. We concentrate on two 
specific examples representing separate categories of these devices: the provision of an annual 
sustainability report (a form of increased disclosure) and adoption of an independent board 
committee tasked with managing social responsibility issues (a form of structural change).  Each 
of these devices have been increasingly adopted by companies in the US, as shown in Figure 1, 
which tracks their adoption among our sample of 300 large public companies.      
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
In the case of Nike discussed above, it appears that Nike became more open to activists in 
the early 2000s, after being battered by activists for decades.  Thus, Nike may have learned that a 
more open approach to its activist stakeholders could help the company save face and restore its 
brand’s identification with socially laudable norms and values.   Indeed, a closer look at Nike’s 
social practices during its transitional period shows that the company adopted both of the social 
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management devices explored in our paper.  In 2001, the company began issuing an annual 
corporate social responsibility report to all of its shareholders, and it also adopted a new formal 
Corporate Responsibility Committee at the board level, which it staffed with four independent 
directors who meet several times each year.  The Committee’s charter states that it is tasked with 
“review[ing] strategies and plans for corporate responsibility,” including the provision of 
“recommendations regarding labor and environmental practices, community affairs, charitable 
foundation activities, diversity and equal opportunity, and environmental and sustainability 
initiatives.”  In the wake of activism, it seems, Nike came to recognize its social performance as 
a strategic problem that warranted escalation to the highest levels of its management structure, as 
well as increased disclosure to demonstrate the substance of its social commitment to its 
stakeholders.   Though anecdotal, we suggest that the case of Nike reflects a common pattern 
among companies facing large amounts criticism from activists.  Companies for which activism 
becomes a persistent and oppressive strategic problem are similarly likely to seek out social 
management devices to help them manage their social reputation and demonstrate an enhanced 
commitment to their stakeholder audiences.  
Hypothesis 1: Firms that are targeted with more social activist challenges will be more 
likely to adopt social management devices. 
 
Though they are adopted as a defensive response to activist challenges, social 
management devices can also make companies more receptive to activist challenges, serving as a 
mediating mechanism between activist challenges and increased corporate social responsiveness.  
This could happen in one of two ways.  First, social management devices may entail increased 
disclosure, which can empower internal and external monitors by providing them with easier 
access to information about a firm’s social activities.  For example, firms that issue a corporate 
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social responsibility report increase attention to social issues within the firm (as internal firm 
actors will have to prepare the report), but they also provide information to external monitors 
about where the firm’s social priorities lie.  This information may allow monitors to more easily 
point to behavioral aberrations or areas in which the firm needs to improve, empowering activists 
with greater leverage over targets.   
Second, social management devices can lead to enhanced corporate social responsiveness 
by instituting and enabling independent monitors, which better equip social activists to hold a 
firm accountable for problematic social behaviors.  Independent monitors who are capable of 
scrutinizing and influencing a firm’s behavior play an important role in shaping corporate social 
responsibility (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Campbell 2007). For example, prior studies of 
transnational movements suggest that NGOs and social movement organizations play 
instrumental roles in bringing about reform by establishing codes of conduct and promoting 
organizational compliance (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Employees can also act as monitors who 
encourage socially responsible behavior.  For example, Raeburn (2004) finds that intra-firm 
employee groups helped win organizational support for providing marriage benefits to domestic 
partners.  Also, Johnson and Greening (1999) find that the prevalence of independent directors 
on corporate boards is associated with enhanced corporate social performance.  When a firm 
formally designates a committee charged with overseeing its social and public policy, the firm 
empowers directors to act as internal monitors.  Involved directors will be more likely to attend 
to and consider social issues. Moreover, directors on a social responsibility committee are made 
accountable for the firm’s social actions, as they could be blamed for exposed transgressions. 
This should increase the extent to which these directors will take action to respond to potential 
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social problems.  In this way, social responsibility committees should lead firms to be more 
receptive to social challenges. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that adopt social management devices will become more receptive to 
activist challenges. 
 
DATA, METHODS, AND ANALYSIS 
We randomly selected a sample of 300 firms that were included in the Fortune 500 at 
some point between 1993 and 2009 and were established before 1990.  We followed each of 
these firms from 1993-2009, creating a panel dataset with observations at the level of the firm-
year. By limiting our sample to firms that were established before 1990, we were able to avoid 
any left censoring in the panel.  We test each hypothesis in a separate set of models.  Across all 
models, unless otherwise noted, all independent and control variables are lagged one year in 
order to avoid temporal endogeneity.   
We collected data on proxy proposals using the Interfaith Council on Corporate 
Responsibility’s (ICCR) archives of social-issue proxy proposals. The ICCR has helped 
coordinate shareholder activism on social issues among its members since 1971. It began as a 
coalition of religious organizations, but now includes a wide-range of NGOs and institutional 
investors in its membership. Today, it is a dominant institutional coordinator of shareholder 
activism.  To assist shareholder activist campaigns, the ICCR tracks and maintains detailed 
information on socially-oriented shareholder resolutions, including the proponent and subject of 
the resolution, as well as the company’s response to it.  
  We collected boycott data using a media content analysis of Factiva’s “Major News and 
Press Release Wires” database.  We trained a team of research assistants to search for each 
company’s name in the database along with the search string (boycott or boycotts or boycotting 
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or boycotted).  They then content coded all articles reporting a boycott of a public company.  
Prior studies of boycotts have utilized a similar method of identifying boycotts through the 
content analysis of newspaper articles (e.g., King 2008; McDonnell and King 2013; Friedman 
1985).  This search resulted in a total corpus of 439 articles referencing 210 unique boycotts 
brought against the companies in our sample.  A total of 22.4% of the boycotts we identified 
ended in a concession, which is similar to the 25% concession rate found in King’s (2008) 
separate sample of US boycotts. 
 
Dependent Variables 
To test Hypothesis 1, which predicts that firms facing more activist challenges will be 
more likely to adopt social management devices, we employ discrete-time event history models 
to explore firms’ adoption of two separate examples of social management devices: a CSR 
Report and a CSR Committee. Each social management device is a binary variable, coded “1” if a 
firm adopts the device in a given year, and “0” if not.  Data on CSR Reports were collected using 
the Global Reporting Initiative’s archival database of public company CSR or sustainability 
reports.3  We gathered data on CSR committees through a search of the committee lists reported 
in each company’s annual proxy statement, which can be found at the SEC’s Edgar database 
repository of public company filings.4 In the proxy statements (filed as Form 14a DEF with the 
SEC), companies provide a one-paragraph description of each of the official committees of the 
board. We coded a new board committee as a CSR committee if its description explicitly 
mentioned that the committee’s role included oversight of corporate social responsibility, social 
                                                          
3 Available at http://database.globalreporting.org/ 
4 Available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml 
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policy, public policy, or environmental issues.  For example, in its 2003 annual proxy statement, 
General Electric introduced a new committee titled “Public Responsibilities Committee,” the 
purpose of which it describes as “to review and oversee our positions on corporate social 
responsibilities and public issues of significance which affect investors and other key GE 
stakeholders.”  Normally the language used to describe the purpose of committees in corporate 
annual proxy materials is taken directly from each board committee’s founding charter. 
The central dependent variable used to test Hypothesis 2 is a firm’s receptivity to activist 
challenges. We operationalize receptivity as the variance in a firm’s responses to all social-issue 
shareholder proposals that it received in the prior year. A firm can react to shareholder proposals 
in three distinct and readily observable ways, which indicate receptivity, neutrality, or resistance.  
First, the firm could agree to implement the proposal without putting it up to a vote, in which 
case the proposal is withdrawn (signaling receptivity and willingness to negotiate with activists).  
Second, the firm could refuse to implement the proposal, but voluntarily allow the proposal to go 
to a vote at the annual meeting (indicating a more neutral stance toward activists, insofar as it 
gives the proponent-activist an outlet through which to voice their issue). Third, the firm could 
seek to challenge the proposal by petitioning the SEC for permission to exclude it from the 
annual proxy (signaling hostility to activists).  Responses to shareholder proposals are a 
particularly useful tool for studying corporate receptivity because, unlike other forms of 
activism, the processes for resisting a shareholder proposal are both formalized and public, 
which make it possible to separate resistant firms that actively fight against a challenge and more 
neutral firms that simply ignore the challenge. This is contrasted with the case of challenges like 
boycotts, where firm responses can typically only be captured as a binary variable indicating 
whether a target did or did not concede, conflating resistant and neutral firms (e.g., King 2008).   
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Our measure of receptivity to activists is based on the Janis-Fadner (JF) coefficient of 
imbalance, which is a formula that has been used in the past to capture the overall emotional 
valence of media articles (Janis and Fadner 1985; Pollock and Rindova 2003; Pfarrer, Pollock, 
and Rindova 2010).  The JF coefficient is usually constructed by coding media articles as 
negative, neutral, or positive, then collapsing them into a variable capturing their overall 
emotional bent.  Like media articles, firm responses to social proxy proposals are negative, 
neutral or positive, so the JF coefficient is a useful tool to extend to the present context as an 
operationalization of overall firm receptivity to social activists.  The JF coefficient equals: 
(P2 – PN)/V 2 if P > N; 0 if P = N; and (PN  - N 2 )/V 2 if N > P, 
Where P is the number of positive firm responses to social-issue proxy proposals (i.e., 
withdrawals), N is the number of negative responses (i.e., challenges), and V is the total number 
of social-issue proxy proposals submitted to a firm in a given year.  The JF coefficient produces 
a variable with a range from -1 to 1.  Firms with a JF coefficient of -1 challenged all social-issue 
proxy proposals submitted in a given year and firms with a JF coefficient of 1 voluntarily agreed 
to implement all of the social proxy proposals the received. 
 The receptivity variable captures the JF coefficient of a firm’s responses to all social 
proxy proposals that it received in the prior year. When a firm received no social proxy proposals 
in the prior year, we use the JF coefficient of its responses in the last year in which it received at 
least one social issue proxy proposal.  We carry over a firm’s past receptivity in years when it 
does not receive a social proxy proposal because we conceive of receptivity as a reputational 
signal that is conferred from historical past encounters with activists (Briscoe and Safford 2008).  
If a firm was actively resistant the last time that it was approached by activists, they likely 
continue to assume that it is resistant until it proves otherwise. We ran supplemental models 
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coding receptivity as “0” in years in which no social issue proxy proposal is received.  We also 
ran models in which we omitted firm-years in which no social proxy proposals were received.  
Our results were robust to each of these alternative formulations. 
 
Independent Variables 
The primary independent variable used to test Hypothesis 1 is total activist challenges, a 
count variable capturing the total number of times in the prior year that a firm was confronted 
with either a boycott or a proxy proposal.  We include both of these categories of challenges 
because, just as social movement activists targeting the policies of states (e.g., Meyer and 
Staggenborg 1996), anti-corporate activists choose from a variety of venues for advocating 
changes in corporate policy. With $2000.00 worth of a company’s stock, activists can put their 
policy initiative on the company’s annual proxy ballot to be voted on by all of the shareholders 
of the organization (Rao and Sivakumar 1999), or they can employ extra-institutional tactics like 
protests, boycotts, or negative media campaigns to place pressure on the organization to reform 
(Soule 2009; King and Pearce 2010).  By including both boycotts (an extra-institutional tactic) 
and proxy proposals (an institutional tactic) in our measure of total activist challenges, we seek 
to capture the general amount of activist challenges that a firm receives from within and without 
formal institutional channels.  Given that prior work has found that the same types of companies 
are targeted by all types of activist challenges (Vasi and King 2012), we believe that the 
inclusion of these two variables is enough to offer a reasonable proxy for the overall distribution 
of activist challenges targeting the companies in our sample. 
Of course, there are important differences between extra-institutional tactics like boycotts 
and institutional tactics like proxy proposals.  First, institutional tactics are often regulated in 
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ways that restrict how quickly they can be used to engage the company.  In the case of proxy 
proposals, a shareholder must have held at least $2,000 of stock for at least one year prior to the 
submission of a proxy proposal, and the proposal must be submitted well before the annual 
meeting in which it will be voted on (the exact amount of time varies by company, but is 
typically 180 days).  Given these regulations, institutional tactics may be less useful for quick 
mobilization efforts that seek an immediate response from a firm.  Vasi and King (2012) argue 
that institutional tactics, unlike extra-institutional tactics, have more credibility in the eyes of 
managers and are more likely to be taken seriously by investors and analysts. It is also true, 
however, that proxy proposals do not provide activists with a fully open or democratic outlet.  
This is because, firstly, social proxy proposals will almost certainly not win majority support.  
According to Proxy Monitor’s database of proposals submitted to the Fortune 250, only four of 
the 1,181 proposals submitted to the Fortune 250 between 2006 and 2014 won a majority vote.  
Secondly, shareholder proposals are legally non-binding in virtually all cases, such that a firm’s 
directors exercise final discretion as to whether and how to respond, regardless of the number of 
votes the proposal wins (Monks and Minow 2001). For these reasons, the primary purpose of the 
tactic is not to formally force concession through democratic engagement, but rather, like its 
extra-institutional counterparts, to raise awareness and problematize the issue being advocated.  
Thus, we contend that shareholder proposals are properly conceived, alongside protests and 
boycotts, as a form of “disruptive activity” (Walker and Rea 2014).  Still, given that boycotts and 
proxy proposals occur in very different institutional spaces and may therefore be interpreted 
differently by their targets (Vasi and King 2012), we also run a set of models that separate the 





Prior research suggests that activists are more likely to target large, high-status firms, 
which tend to attract more media attention (King 2008; 2011; Bartley and Child 2014; King and 
McDonnell 2015).  We account for this by including three controls, namely: logged number of 
employees (to capture variation in firm size), logged media attention (the logged count of the 
number of news articles about a company in a given year, as reported in Factiva), and status 
(derived from the reputation scores provided in Fortune’s annual list of the Most Admired 
Companies).  We control for status using a binary variable that is coded as a “1” if a firm 
appeared in the Most Admired Companies list in a given year, and “0” otherwise. The Fortune 
Most Admired Companies list is constructed using surveys of the managers of each company’s 
industry peers, making it a useful proxy for capturing insiders’ perceptions about which firms 
inhabit the incumbent elite within their field. 
Firms’ perceived social responsibility is also expected to affect the likelihood that they 
will be targeted by activist challenges (King and McDonnell 2015).  In order to control for a 
firm’s reputation for social responsibility, we used data from KLD Research and Analytics, a 
third party rating system of firms’ social performance.  Our measure of perceived social 
responsibility is the difference between the number of strengths and the number weaknesses 
listed in the index (KLD Analytics, 2006).  Because KLD does not rate every firm in our sample 
and did not collect data for every year in our sample, we were missing data for 1,378 firm-years.  
We used Stata’s multiple imputation regression command (mi impute regress) to generate the 
missing values, using values of observed variables in the regression to posteriorly predict values 
of the missing variable (see Mustillo (2012) for an overview of multiple imputation for 
sociological research).   
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To account for the possibility that a firm’s receptivity or resistance to activist challenges 
will predict their adoption of social management devices, we control for lagged receptivity in our 
models predicting the adoption of CSR Reports and CSR Committees.  The receptivity variable in 
these models is the lagged version of the receptivity dependent variable described above.  Also, 
given that firms that have already adopted social management devices may be more likely to 
continue to search for additional devices, we control for whether a firm has already adopted a 
CSR Report when predicting its adoption of CSR Committees, and vice versa. 
To account for the possibility that a firm’s performance affects its stakeholder 
interactions, we control for Tobin’s Q, which is a common market-based proxy for firm 
performance that is operationalized as the market value of assets divided by the replacement 
costs of assets.  While accounting measures such as return on assets are also commonly used as 
proxies for firm performance, Tobin’s Q is gaining traction within the management and strategy 
research as a preferable measure of firm performance insofar as it is forward-looking (implicitly 
incorporating the value of potential growth opportunities and future operating performance) and 
less susceptible to manipulation by managers (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Miller, Xu, and 
Mehrotra 2014).  We also include fixed effects for each firm’s SIC major industry division.  
Finally, to account for general temporal trends in activist targeting, we include an annual year 
variable, coded as “0” in 1993, the first year of our panel, and counting up by one each year to 
“17” in 2009, the final year of our panel. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 1 below. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 To further probe the differences in the distribution of our control variables across 
receptivity, we split our firm-year observations into three groups: resistant firms (receptivity < 
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0), neutral firms (receptivity = 0), and receptive firms (receptivity > 0).  A comparison of these 
categories is provided in Table 2, below.  Interestingly, neutral firms are the least likely to be 
targeted by both boycotts and proxy proposals.  They also are the smallest (in terms of total 
employees), have the lowest status, and garner the least amount of media attention.  Resistant 
firms are targeted the most heavily by both boycotts and proxy proposals, and resistant firms also 
are significantly larger and attract more media attention than receptive firms.  Receptive firms 
perform significantly better than neutral firms, but their performance does not significantly differ 
from resistant firms.  We find no significant differences between the three groups in terms of 
their perceived social responsibility.   
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Analysis 
We test Hypothesis 1 using discrete-time event history analyses predicting the initial 
dissemination of a sustainability report and the adoption of a board committee dedicated to CSR, 
respectively.  For each model, all companies are included in the risk set so long as they have not 
adopted the device in question.  The dependent variable is coded “0” in all years in which a firm 
has not adopted the device in question and is coded “1” in years in which an adoption event takes 
place.  No firm in the sample ceased to have a device after an adoption event, so firms are 
omitted for not being in the risk set in all years after the adoption event in question takes place.  
Because there is wide variation in the timing and rate of adoption for the social management 
devices explored here, the number of observations varies across these models.   
The initial dissemination of a CSR report and the adoption of a CSR board committee 
could occur within the same year (in which case they would be treated as simultaneous within 
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our models) and it is certainly possible that firms seeking out one social management device may 
be more likely than others to conduct a broad search and adopt more than one device 
simultaneously.  This suggests that the dependent variables used in our initial set of discrete-time 
event history models may not be independent from one another.  To account for this possibility, 
we estimate a multivariate probit model, which allows for the simultaneous prediction of the 
likelihood of adoption of a CSR committee or CSR report.   
We also ran a series of supplemental analyses to serve as robustness checks to our 
discrete-time event history models.  First, given that all adoption events represent relatively rare 
events, we replicated our model with King and Zang’s (2001) statistical correction for rare 
events.  We also sought to account for potential heteroskedasticity by replicating our models as a 
panel logit regression with random effects and clustered standard errors, employing the xtlogit 
command in Stata 13.  To account for the potential endogeneity of total activist challenges, we 
used a two-step probit regression in which we instrumented for total challenges using the 
ivprobit command in Stata 13.  In the first stage, following prior work (Vasi and King 2012), we 
regressed total activist challenges on three instrumental variables: lagged total boycotts, lagged 
proxy proposals, and lagged human rights concerns reported by the KLD. In the second stage 
probit models, the total activist challenges variable is then replaced by the predicted values 
produced from the first-stage regression.  The results pertaining to our variables of interest across 
all supplemental models were substantively similar to those provided here.  Additionally, the 
Wald test for exogeneity in the instrumental variables probit models was insignificant (p = 0.55), 
yielding no statistical evidence of the endogeneity of total activist challenges within the present 
statistical setting.  Finally, we wanted to rule out the possibility that social management devices 
were direct concessions to the social shareholder proposals, rather than defensive responses to 
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them.  To examine this, we combed through all of the proxy proposals in our database to isolate 
those that directly requested adoption of a CSR committee or a sustainability report.  While we 
found no instances of a proxy proposal requesting a CSR committee in our database, we did find 
194 proposals that requested enhanced disclosure through a CSR/sustainability report.   We only 
found three instances, however, in which a company first promulgated a sustainability report in 
the year following the introduction of such a proposal, so direct responses do not seem to be the 
primary explanatory factor driving our findings.  Indeed, many proposals asking for disclosure 
were submitted to companies that already issue sustainability reports, in which case the proposals 
request that the reports include supplemental material.  Re-running the models with the three 
direct responders excluded produced substantively similar results to those shown here.   
We test the relationship between the adoption of social management devices and future 
receptivity to social activism (Hypothesis 2) using a quasi-experimental approach in which we 
compare the change in receptivity among firms that adopted a social management device (the 
“treatment group”) with a matched set of firms that did not (the “control group”). The primary 
independent – or treatment -- variable used to test Hypothesis 2 is the adoption of a social 
management device. This variable is coded 1 in any year in which a firm adopted a new social 
management device.  For example, a report treatment occurs when a firm that did not have a 
CSR report in year t-1 began to produce a CSR report in year t.  A committee treatment is 
similarly coded 1 in the year in which a firm first adopted a board committee designated to social 
responsibility, environmental issues, or public policy.  We also test an all treatment variable that 
is coded 1 if a firm adopted either of these two social management devices in a given year. 
To construct the control group, we first generated predicted probabilities from each of the 
event history models used to test Hypothesis 1 (Models 3-4, Table 3). Then, we employed 
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nearest-neighbor propensity score matching to pair each firm that experienced the adoption of a 
social management device with the firm that was at the most similar risk of adopting the device 
in the same year, but did not adopt it. Propensity score matching allows us to compare two 
groups that are equally matched on relevant selection criteria but that differ in their exposure to 
the treatment (e.g., King et al. 2007).  This resulted in a 1:1 matched set of treated firms paired 
with the most observably similar set of untreated firms in terms of those factors most likely to 
predict the adoption of social management devices (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1998).  
To compare the trends in openness pre-and post- adoption between the treated and 
control firms, we conducted difference-in-difference analyses wherein the receptivity variable 
described above is the dependent variable. We began by transforming the data into a panel 
dataset in which each firm is observed twice: once in the year prior to an adoption event and 
once in the year after an adoption event, including fixed effects for firm and year.  The models 
utilize two key binary variables: a period variable (coded “0” for the treatment firm and its match 
in the year prior to an adoption event and “1” in the year after) and a treatment variable (coded 
“0” for all control firms and “1” for all treated firms).  The difference estimator, which compares 
the change in the dependent variable across the treatment and control groups, is captured as an 
interaction of the period and treatment variables.  Again, we employ robust standard errors.   
 
RESULTS 
Results for our models testing Hypothesis 1 – that firms facing more social activism will 
be more likely to adopt social management devices – are displayed in Table 3. Models 1-4 
comprise a series of four event history analyses, predicting the likelihood that a firm will begin 
to issue a CSR report (Models 1 and 3) or institute a formal CSR Committee (Models 2 and 4). 
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In Models 1 and 2, we test our general hypothesis that firms that face more activist challenges 
will be more likely to adopt a social management device.  We find support for this hypothesis 
across both models, as the total number of activist challenges that firms received in the prior year 
is positively and significantly related to the likelihood that firms will begin to disseminate a CSR 
report and institute a CSR board committee. 
Our control variables suggest that higher status, better performing companies that receive 
more media attention are more likely to issue CSR reports.  However, we find no evidence that 
these variables similarly predict the adoption of CSR board committees.  In models 1 and 3, we 
find that firms that have a CSR committee in place are more likely to adopt a CSR report.  
Similarly, in models 2 and 4, we find that firms that already issue a CSR report are more likely to 
adopt a CSR board committee.  We interpret these findings as providing evidence that each type 
of social management device is part of a coherent overarching strategy, such that once a firm 
takes initial steps to alter its structures and practices to better manage social issues, it is likely to 
continue to seek out and adopt new social management devices in the future. 
In models 3-4 we disaggregate the total number of activist challenges into separate counts 
of boycotts and proxy proposals.  In model 3, we find that proxy proposals are significantly 
related to the likelihood of issuing a CSR report, whereas the boycotts variable is not significant.  
In model 4, in contrast, we find that boycotts are significantly related to the likelihood of 
adopting a CSR board committee, whereas the proxy proposals variable is not significant.  These 
results provide interesting evidence that the type of social management device that companies 
adopt may depend on the type of activist challenge that the company faces.  Although we did not 
hypothesize these effects, the findings are consistent with our understanding of the manner of 
influence exerted by the different tactics.  Past research has shown that extra-institutional tactics 
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like boycotts influence their targets by generating negative media attention and provoking 
reputational threat (King 2008; 2011).  Firms might seek to respond to these tactics by creating 
structural reforms like CSR committees that help them directly engage with activists, reducing 
the potential for future activist grievances to turn into reputational threats against the firm. 
Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that many firms have this in mind when creating CSR 
committees. For example, Samsung’s website states that the purpose of its CSR committee is to 
build “relationships with various stakeholders through open dialogues and collaboration.”5   
In contrast to extra-institutional tactics, social proxy proposals influence firms by 
prompting industry analysts and investors to see the target firm as a riskier investment (Vasi and 
King 2012). Inasmuch as proxy proposals foster perceptions of risk among analysts and 
investors, firms may seek to counter them by disclosing information that helps these stakeholders 
arrive at more balanced risk assessments. By disseminating a CSR report, firms are able to 
convey more detailed information about activities and policies that might be seen as a source of 
risk by analysts and investors, such as sustainability measures, supply chain practices, and areas 
of ethical concerns. Thus, different tactics may lead firms to adopt different types of social 
management devices in order to counter the tactic’s distinct type of influence. 
Model 5 provides the results for the simultaneous multivariate probit models predicting 
adoption of CSR reports and CSR committees.  Again, we find that proxy proposals, and not 
boycotts, significantly predict the initial provision of a CSR report.  But in this model we find 
that both proxy proposals and boycotts are positively related to the adoption of a CSR 
committee. 
                                                          
5 Information about the CSR committee can be found on the company’s website: 
http://www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/investor_relations/corporate_governance/boardcom
mittees/IR_CSRCommittee.html (last accessed: September 19, 2014) 
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[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Results for the models used to test Hypothesis 2 – that social management devices lead to 
increased corporate receptivity – are shown in Table 4.  Model 1 includes only the companies 
that began issuing a CSR report and their matched, control firms (77 treatment firms and 77 
control firms); Model 2 includes only the companies that adopted a CSR committee and their 
matched, control firms (44 treatment firms and 44 control firms) and Model 3 combines these 
models to include all companies that adopted either of these social management devices, as well 
as the full set of matched control firms (121 treatment firms and 121 control firms).    
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Across all models, the main effect of the treatment variables is not significant, suggesting 
that there are no significant differences in the receptivity of the treatment firms and their matches 
in the year prior to a treatment event.  The period variable in models 1 and 3 is negative and 
significant, indicating that the matched, control firms became significantly less receptive 
between the pre- and post- treatment periods.  Across all models, we find a significant and 
positive difference estimator, suggesting that firms that experienced a treatment (i.e., firms that 
either began distributing a CSR report or that adopted a CSR committee on their board) became 
more receptive to activist challenges in the post-treatment period, as compared to the matched set 
of firms that did not experience a treatment.  These results lend strong support to our Hypothesis 
2, supporting a conclusion that social management devices led firms to become more receptive to 
future activist challenges.     
We also took separate steps to rule out the possibility that social management devices are 
endogenous with social responsibility (i.e., that firms that become more socially responsible are 
both more likely to adopt social management devices and more likely to become more receptive 
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to activist challenges over time).  In addition to controlling for perceived CSR in our models, we 
tested this alternative theory directly by replicating our difference-in-differences models with 
perceived CSR as the dependent variable.  The difference estimator was not significant in any of 
these models, suggesting that there is no concomitant increase in social responsibility that might 
explain the changes in receptivity we observe in our Table 4 models.  This increases our 
confidence in claiming that it is the adoption of social management devices themselves, and not a 
more general increase in social responsibility, that moderates the relationship between being 
targeted by activist challenges and becoming more receptive to future activist challenges. 
In an additional robustness analysis, in Table 5 we include models that assess the 
duration of these effects over longer time periods. An alternative interpretation of our main 
finding is that targets become momentarily more responsive to movements at the same time that 
they adopt social management devices, but that adoptions do not have a lasting effect on a firm’s 
opportunity structure. To rule out this possibility, in models shown in Table 5, below, we ran 
regressions in which the dependent variables are changes in receptivity over longer time periods 
(t-1 to t+2; t-1 to t+3; t-1 to t+4). We find a consistent effect of the difference estimator in each 
period of change, indicating that the positive effect of adopting social management devices on 
receptivity to activists persisted beyond the year after initial adoption. These results confirm that 
adopting social management devices leads to an enduring change in the opportunity structures of 
the targeted companies, even as late as four years after the initial adoption of a device.  
[Insert Table 5 here]  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we explore two types of corporate and activist interaction in order to shed 
light on the dynamic process through which corporate opportunity structures evolve in response 
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to activist challenges.  First, we explore the question of whether firms that are targeted by activist 
challenges defensively alter the practices and structures they use to manage and respond to 
contentious social issues.  We find support for our hypothesis that firms facing more extreme 
levels of activism will adopt social management devices; devices that help defend a firm’s public 
image by demonstrating an increased commitment to social issues.  We modeled the adoption of 
two examples of these devices: the issuance of a CSR report and the adoption of a CSR board 
committee.  Our results suggest that activism is positively associated with firms’ adoption of 
each of these devices, suggesting that targeted firms seek out these strategic devices in an effort 
to address concerns about their public image and reputation.  
We also found that the type of social management device firms adopt depends on the type 
of tactics activists use. Inasmuch as boycotts create reputational threats, firms respond by 
adopting CSR committees, a structural reform intended to open dialogue with stakeholders and 
prevent grievances from turning into future reputational threats. Inasmuch as social proxy 
proposals create perceptions of risk among industry analysts and investors, firms respond by 
adopting CSR reports, a form of disclosure intended to provide contrary information to 
stakeholders that will help them form balanced assessments of risk.  
Next, we explore whether firms that adopt social management devices become more 
receptive to future activist attacks.  Because activist attacks prompt firms to seek out social 
management devices, we argue that these devices moderate the relationship between activism 
and the opening up of corporate opportunity structures.  Specifically, we find that when firms 
that adopt a social management device are compared to a control set of similarly situated firms 
that did not, the treatment firms become significantly more open to social challenges in the post-
treatment period.  This final analysis sheds light on a mechanism through which opportunity 
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structures evolve within the political process, suggesting that defensive strategic devices that 
targets adopt in the wake of interactions with activist challengers may also cause incidental 
increases in the target’s openness to future activist advances.   
Our work has important implications for social movement theory, organizational theory, 
and the literature on corporate social responsibility, each of which is discussed in turn below. 
 
Implications for the Social Movements Literature 
Our findings contribute to social movement theory by providing evidence that movement 
challenges are not only affected by, but can also affect, the opportunity structures of their targets.  
Specifically, we propose a process by which a movement’s activity can open avenues of 
influence for later movements.  Targets that face activist challenges make structural reforms and 
increase disclosure in order to reduce potential threats to their image, which in turn makes the 
target more receptive to when it is challenged by activists in the future. This idea, while 
underexplored, is not wholly absent from the broader social movements literature.  For example, 
Soule et al. (1999) show that feminist activism impacted the federal political opportunity 
structure, which in turn became more open to subsequent claims-making by women. Or, Costain 
(1992) suggests that by virtue of including women among the identity classes protected in the 
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights movement (largely 
inadvertently) paved the way for the later women’s movement. While the anti-corporate activists 
whose challenges are explored in this paper may not intend to ripen corporate opportunities for 
later movements, our findings suggest that this consequence can occur when targeted 
corporations adopt defensive structures and practices that provide leverage to successive activist 
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advances.6  More generally, our results suggest that political and corporate opportunities are not 
static structures; rather, they are dynamic and responsive to social movement activities. This 
insight lends support to a more agentic view of the structure-heavy political process model 
(Goodwin and Jasper 1999).  
Relatedly, our findings contribute to the broader effort to understand the outcomes of 
social movements by exploring outcomes at the nexus of two established streams of social 
movement research: advantages vs. acceptance, and direct vs. indirect outcomes (Snow and 
Soule 2010). Outcome-oriented social movement research in the corporate context has focused 
predominantly on movements’ abilities to achieve their intended goals (e.g., Rojas 2006; Bartley 
2007; King 2008a; Soule 2009; Weber, Rao and Thomas 2009).  This work was spurred largely 
by Gamson’s (1990) suggestion that movement success could be categorized in terms of gaining 
new advantages or acceptance.  New advantages refer to factors that afford a movement more 
access and leverage in its future interactions with an entity, such as newly recognized rights.  
Acceptance occurs when an entity allows a movement’s members to formally participate in 
internal policy-making processes, such as when a political body places movement members into 
positions of formal authority.  While the question of how movements obtain new advantages and 
acceptance may shed light on how particular interests become incorporated into formal policy, to 
understand the more macro question of how social movements in the aggregate change the 
                                                          
6 There are likely analogs to social management devices in the realm of state targets of social 
movements. For example, the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women was established 
in 1961 to assess women’s issues. Or, the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990s stated that data 
should be collected on hate crimes, but did not criminalize hate crimes. More recently, many 
states have passed Climate Action Plans to establish suggested guidelines on reducing emissions. 
All of these measures, passed by federal, state, or local governments, may signal an openness to 
future activism in the same way our social management devices do.  Future research should 
investigate whether or not these function the same way as our social management devices do.  
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institutions in which they are embedded, it is necessary to consider the important, but less 
attended to, indirect or unintended consequences of social movement activism (e.g., Deng 1997).  
For example, scholars studying the impact of movements on markets have found that movements 
often have diffuse, unanticipated consequences like the emergence of new institutional logics 
(Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri 2007), the mobilization of resources and identities that cultivate 
new markets and industries (Sine and Lee 2009; Hiatt, Sine and Tolbert 2009), or changes in 
corporate behavior, such as increased charitable and pro-social activity (McDonnell and King 
2013). This work emphasizes the significant institutional changes that can occur in the wake of a 
social movement, independent of the movement’s ability to achieve its immediate goals.   
Our work complements and extends this prior work several ways.  In effect, our findings 
synthesize these two research streams on movement outcomes by exploring the uncharted 
territory of how social movements may indirectly generate new advantages for the larger 
population of social activists. Our findings suggest that movements provoke indirect, defensive 
responses from their targets in the form of strategic management devices.  While movements 
may not be able to participate in these devices directly, they afford movements new opportunities 
for influence by increasing the information that activists have at their disposal, instituting and 
empowering monitors to search for and address social problems, and increasing corporate 
accountability for social actions through public commitments. While we must leave to future 
research the question of the extent to which these devices bring about veritable improvements in 
social justice, inequality, and other movement outcomes, we do provide evidence that they tend 
to increase a company’s receptivity to social activist challenges. Thus, we propose that social 
movements are part of a dynamic, self-reinforcing process that fosters an environment in which 
activism can thrive.  Through the challenges of activists that came before, later activists obtain 
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new advantages that allow them greater voice and more liberal opportunities to influence 
corporate policy. 
A final contribution of our study to social movement theory is to focus on intermediary 
outcomes of strategic interactions between movements and their targets. Jasper and Poulsen 
(1993) were among the first to call for greater analytic emphasis on strategic responses to 
movements by their targets. Other theoretical perspectives, like field theory (Martin 2003; 
Fligstein and McAdam 2012) and game theories of behavior (Camerer 2003; Baron and 
Diermeier 2007), have similarly pushed scholars to consider how strategic interactions might 
produce macro-outcomes of interest, such as shifts in field-level rules or sweeping changes in 
corporate behavior. Our analysis offers an empirical window into these theoretical questions 
about the strategic responses of targets to movements and the consequences of these responses. 
Future empirical research ought to further integrate insights from field theory and game theory to 
supplement our social movement view of strategic responses.  
 
Implications for Organizational Theory 
 Organizational sociologists have long emphasized that organizations symbolically convey 
their alignment with institutional norms (e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977; Edelman 1992). 
Decoupling the symbolic adoption of structures and practices from the substantive work of the 
organization is integral to organizations’ symbolic management (Westphal and Zajac 1994). 
Through symbolic adoptions, organizations protect themselves from having to make more 
fundamental changes. Our findings suggest, in contrast, that symbolic adoptions meant to 
appease certain stakeholders may, in fact, have long-term substantive consequences. Adopting 
social management devices, which may be initially intended merely as symbolic gestures, change 
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the relationship between the organization and activist stakeholders, concomitantly shaping these 
firms’ commitments and character. In a sense, this process is similar to the co-optation process 
observed by Selznick (1949), although in this setting it occurs at a much slower and incremental 
pace. As firms seek to shelter themselves from activists’ attacks by adopting social management 
devices, they open the door for gradual co-optation by those very activists. Of course, one 
possibility that we do not explore in this study is that this co-optation also fundamentally 
changes the activists as well. As activists form tighter relationships with CSR committees and 
become involved with disclosure procedures, they may also become less radical, and temper 
their claims against the firm. Future research ought to explore these potential consequences of 
increased corporate receptivity to activists. 
 
Implications for the Literature on Corporate Social Responsibility  
Our work also has important implications for the literature on corporate social 
responsibility.  Critical of the collective effort of past CSR scholarship to wedge social 
responsibility into a neo-liberal conception of the firm, Margolis and Walsh (2002) urge 
organizational scholars to assume a novel, pragmatic vantage. Rather than searching for an 
empirical connection between social performance and financial performance, they argue, we 
ought to begin with a more descriptive inquiry into the means to the end of corporate social 
practice.  Sociologists have also begun to develop a more complex understanding of the spread 
of corporate social responsibility, demonstrating that social responsibility commitments are both 
a product of global institutional forces and local relationships to stakeholders and other firms 
(e.g., Lim and Tsutsui 2012; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis 2007).  
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Our paper seeks to contribute to these inquiries by shedding light on the dynamic political 
process in which corporate-stakeholder interactions take place.  Prior studies have linked 
corporate social responsibility to contentious politics, but have conceptualized the process as a 
simple direct relationship: activists notice a particular social problem, target the offending firms, 
and, if successful, can coerce these firms to concede to their more socially responsible agenda 
(e.g., King 2008; Soule 2009).  In contrast, our findings suggest that activism and increased 
corporate social responsibility reinforce one another through a feedback cycle of activist activity 
and increased receptivity to activists, mediated by the adoption of social management devices.  
These social management devices elicit increased social commitments from organizations, as 
well as instituting and empowering internal and external monitors who can enforce social 
expectations of appropriate corporate behavior.  In this way, activist challenges can provoke a 
more generalizable, longer lasting change in corporations’ receptivity to social challenges than 
has been previously recognized.  Although not explored in our paper, it is possible that sustained 
activist challenges may actually begin to change the strategic mindset of executives, leading 
them to become increasingly sensitive to stakeholder and social issues. Of course, we recognize 
that as social management devices become commonplace, firms may begin to adopt them for 
anticipatory reasons or out of mimetic pressure.  Further, as the population of firms becomes 
more receptive to social challenges, executives may become more willing to engage activists 
without seeking defensive measures first.  Future work is needed to explore the micro-level 
processes that foster and produce increased receptivity to social issues.    
Our results further suggest that the specific type of social management devices that firms 
seek out is partly driven by the type of activist challenge they face.  While we find that proxy 
proposals, an institutional challenge, increase the likelihood that their targets will disseminate 
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CSR reports, we find that boycotts, an extra-institutional tactic, increase the likelihood that their 
targets will adopt CSR board committees.  This may be explained by differences in the way that 
targeted firms experience institutional and extra-institutional tactics.  Prior work suggests, for 
example, that proxy proposals are primarily experienced by firms as an indicator of enhanced 
environmental risk (Vasi and King, 2012). Disclosure through CSR reports is likely to palliate 
this risk by reducing investor uncertainty about a firm’s social and environmental behavior, 
allowing for more accurate estimations of the extent of the firm’s non-market risk.  Boycotts, to 
the contrary, suggest a breakdown in the firm’s ability to manage contentious stakeholders and 
social issues, which could damage the firm’s reputation (McDonnell and King 2013).  By 
establishing a CSR board committee and populating it with independent directors (many of 
whom are drawn from public sector organizations like NGOs and charitable organizations), firms 
may improve their ability to recognize emerging problems early and proactively address them in 
ways that pacify contentious stakeholders. Further exploring variations in the type of defensive 
strategies that firms employ to respond to different classes of activist challenges represents a 

















Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
  
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Boycotts 0.062 0.32 1.00
2 Social Proxy Proposals 0.473 1.06 0.30 1.00
3 Total Activist Challenges 0.534 1.19 0.54 0.97 1.00
4 Status 0.521 0.50 0.08 0.18 0.18 1.00
5 Tobin's Q 0.873 0.34 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 1.00
6 Logged Employees 3.260 1.30 0.22 0.37 0.38 0.39 -0.10 1.00
7 Logged Media Attention 1.687 1.41 0.20 0.29 0.31 0.24 -0.04 0.40 1.00
8 Perceived CSR 0.093 3.39 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.14 1.00
9 Receptivity 0.178 0.47 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.11 0.04 -0.01 1.00
10 CSR Committee 0.195 0.40 0.12 0.25 0.25 0.13 -0.06 0.23 0.15 0.00 0.01 1.00
11 CSR Report 0.067 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.18 0.24 0.12 -0.03 0.25
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Ttest:     
Neutral vs. 
Resistant
Ttest:     
Neutral vs. 
Receptive
Ttest:     
Resistant vs. 
Receptive
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD p = p = p =
Boycotts 0.22 0.68 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
Social Proxy Proposals 1.46 1.81 0.30 0.82 0.63 1.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
Status 0.67 0.47 0.45 0.49 0.65 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.76
Tobin's Q 0.86 0.36 0.88 0.34 0.84 0.37 0.82 0.02 0.33
Logged Employees 4.10 1.21 2.98 1.31 3.79 1.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Logged Media 2.54 1.47 1.52 1.34 2.03 1.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
Perceived Social Responsibility 0.16 4.15 0.17 3.29 0.22 3.57 0.98 0.56 0.76
Resistant Firms (n=304) Neutral Firms (n=3654) Receptive Firms (n=1130)
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Table 3: Models Predicting the Likelihood of the Adoption of Social Management Devicesº 
 
 
°Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by company. 





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Specification Rare Events Logit Regressions
CSR Report CSR Committee CSR Report CSR Committee CSR Report CSR Committee
 Independent Variables
Total Activist Challenges 0.151* 0.235*
(0.080) (0.107)
Total Boycotts -0.0953 0.502* -0.295 0.240*
(0.254) (0.215) (0.294) (0.143)
Total Proxy Proposals 0.193* 0.169 0.120* 0.158**
(0.088) (0.115) (0.062) (0.061)
Control Variables
Status 0.955** 0.261 0.952** 0.296 0.350 0.0627
(0.306) (0.316) (0.304) (0.318) (0.148) (0.142)
Tobin's Q 0.837* 0.705 0.868* 0.709 0.462* 0.346
(0.384) (0.480) (0.090) (0.447) (0.219) (0.213)
Logged Employees 0.198 0.103 0.196 0.0939 0.0373 0.0365
(0.147) (0.164) (0.147) (0.163) (0.071) (0.064)
Logged Media Attention 0.245* 0.198 0.254* 0.184 0.128* 0.025
(0.103) (0.125) (0.103) (0.126) (0.053) (0.052)
Perceived CSR 0.0379 -0.0626 0.0379 -0.0646 0.037 -0.0193
(0.036) (0.046) (0.036) (0.046) (0.020) (0.020)
Receptivity -0.0529 0.233 -0.0472 0.237 -0.0994 0.175
(0.301) (0.339) (0.303) (0.338) (0.131) (0.141)
Year 0.243*** 0.0382 0.241*** 0.0449 0.122*** 0.0231
(0.030) (0.035) (0.030) (0.035) (0.019) (0.013)
CSR Committee 0.702* 0.699**
(0.261) (0.262)
CSR Report 1.566*** 1.623**
(0.489) (0.501)
Industry Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -10.519*** -6.654*** -9.429*** -6.583*** -6.526*** -3.202***
(0.741) (0.868) (0.742) (0.866) (1.604) (0.315)
N 4730 4114 4730 4114
Pseudo R^2 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.10






Discrete Time Event History Models
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Table 4: Difference-in-difference models predicting changes to corporate receptivity to 
shareholder-submitted social challenges 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Period -0.166* -0.126 -0.147**
(0.064) (0.110) (0.053)   
Treatment: Report -0.371                
(0.559)                
Treatment: Committee 0.753                
(0.774)                
Treatment: All 0.438
(0.491)
Dif. Est. Report 0.232*                
(0.100)                
Dif. Est. Committee 0.261*                
(0.131)                
Dif. Est. All 0.232** 
(0.078)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tobin's Q -0.164 0.0767 -0.0450
(0.131) (0.169) (0.099)
Logged Employees -0.00451 0.00113 -0.00436
(0.151) (0.166) (0.099)
Total Activist Challenges 0.0421 -0.0584 0.00588
(0.041) (0.044) (0.031)
Logged Media Attn 0.0572 -0.0556 0.0225
(0.043) (0.089) (0.038)
Status 0.124 0.0526 0.0979
(0.085) (0.140) (0.072)
Perceived CSR -0.0145 0.0110 -0.000256
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011)
Fixed Effects for Firm YES YES YES
Constant 0.332 -0.317 -0.577
(0.892) (0.845) (0.662)
R^2 0.55 0.67 0.59
Observations 308 176 484
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 5: Robustness Analysis Assessing Duration of Effects  
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Time Gap t-1 to t+2 t-1 to t+3 t-1 to t+4
Period -0.113* -0.108 -0.136*
(0.054) (0.068) (0.064)   
Treatment: All 0.486 0.663 1.207
(0.624) (0.712) (0.744)
Dif. Est. All 0.154* 0.228* 0.212*
(0.076) (0.098) (0.107)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tobin's Q -0.199 0.0271 -0.222
(0.126) (0.260) (0.200)
Logged Employees -0.0446 0.132 0.372
(0.188) (0.217) (0.0768)
Total Activist Challenges -0.0339 -0.025 0.0523
(0.0317) (0.0454) (0.0394)
Logged Media Attn 0.0683 0.0189 0.0184
(0.0317) (0.0445) (0.0502)
Status 0.153* 0.268* 0.171*
(0.0753) (0.127) (0.0768)
Fixed Effects for Firm YES YES YES
Constant -0.428 -1.424 -2.156
(0.982) (1.103)) (1.164)
R^2 0.71 0.67 0.68
Observations 400 340 292
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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